From the monthly archives:

April 2009

*cough* Have to work from home *sneeze*?

by NP-Incomplete on April 30, 2009

in SBN

Not that there is any reason to say this, but it is possible that a significant portion of the workforce will be either absent or working from home in the next few months. This could mean opening up the corporate network to far larger numbers of telecommuters whose systems may be in various states of security disrepair. IT managers should be planning on how give secure access to the corporate network to a batch of relatively untrained employees.
If you don't work in the IT department, the story is pretty simple. Get your laptop set up to connect to your work network if it cannot do so already. Laptops that are primarily home systems should be reformatted and installed from scratch if there is any concern that the machine may contain malware; just because you aren't going to work sick doesn't mean your system should.
For those of you who do work in the IT department, well, I don't envy the job ahead of you. If your network wasn't de-perimeterized before, it will be soon, whether you like it or not. Not only do you need to prep employees' personal systems to connect to the corporate infrastructure, you also need to educate them on the risks of bringing a relatively-unclean personal system into the corporate environment. Given that home systems are not nearly as well looked-after as corporate systems, you also are going to be dealing with all the infections that your employee's home PCs will be bringing past the firewall and NAT systems and into the core network.
There aren't too many recommendations I can make that aren't common sense. For example, you can distribute more laptops to employees who don't have them. Also, you should consider extending the corporate licenses for the anti-virus products to the home systems of employees who do not possess a company-managed PC but will be expected to work remotely.
Plans similar to the one described above should be in the dusty business continuity plans that many organizations created in late 2001. It's time to update them and get ready to put them to practice.

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Going Around In Circles

by Tim Cronin on April 30, 2009

in SBN

Let's not start that again...

As of late there has been a heated debate among the community that various forms of standards and compliance are effective/ineffective at actually securing systems and networks. Just a quick note:

First post I read today is from Ascension Risk Management. There was a point/counterpoint that was detailed that, suffice to say, leaned towards the fact that standards and compliance are not effective. In order for something resembling standards to be effective, it must be made too narrow or not actionable. This is a good argument, but it doesn't tell the whole story.

The next blog post I read is from Emergent Chaos. This post was about the fact that after Former/embattled/kind-of/not Senator Norm Coleman's campaign's infrastructure was broken into, and there may possibly have been a breach, donors found out via Wikileaks, rather than the campaign. One quote sticks out:
We need public, documented and debated standards of how such decisions should be made. With such standards, organizations could better make decisions about risk. Additionaly, both regulators and the public could be more comfortable that those piping up about risk were not allowing the payers to call the tune.
So within the same day, there is one school saying that standards are ineffective and there is another stating that we need more standards in order to shuffle through the varied methods people use in regards to security related tasks. What a vicious circle.

I am on the fence. I think that without standards, there are a good amount of small and medium sized businesses that would have no security or extremely lax security. Standards do help to push these organizations into doing more to protect data. On the other hand, with a competent security practitioner, these standards are simply "fill in the box" tests that people adhere to. That security practitioner is likely doing things to secure the infrastructure more than the standard accounts for.

I think standards are simply not scalable. If there must be policy, it should reflect the end result, not the means. It is better to say "you are liable for any breach that occurs" than "you are not allowed to have SSLv2 on your hosts". In this way, it should create an incentive to have network owners and operators think about how to go about security. If there's a breach, they are liable, after all.

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Exploit Sweatshop

by pdp on April 30, 2009

in SBN

When I was playing/introducing the partial disclosure practice an year and something ago, I did get contacted by numerous dodgy characters willing to buy yet undisclosed vulnerabilities for substantial amount of money.

Sweatshop project

Of course, requests of that nature were kindly ignored. I couldn’t believe that someone was willing to give me so much money for something I virtually spent 2-3 hours maximum to produce.

Later on, during the CONFidence 2008 event in Krakow I met a bunch of people who claimed that they already sell exploits to various UK companies and the figures that they were making were outstanding. To give you a clue, given the pound dollar difference at that time, you could have made 6 times more than what ZDI and other similar programs can offer you for a top range exploit. This is already better than a top salary in UK.

Same year, different event… I saw an interesting presentation by Robert McArdle from Trend Micro. The presentation was titled Fighting web Based, Profit-Driven Threats. On one of his slides, Robert commented that cybercrime is becoming more profitable than the drug cartels. Perhaps you wont be able to make as much money from carding as you might expect but you can do quite well selling visualized stuff, such as exploits and exploit toolkits.

Present times, DojoSec Monthly Briefings… Matthew Watchinski from Sourcefire VRT talked about a PDF 0day spreading around Xmas time. The exploit took a couple of good months for Adobe to fix it. The author sold it for 75K to a unknown 3rd-party in China according to Matthew. The vulnerability was also relatively easy to find and required very little experience to exploit.

All of this leads to the very obvious conclusion which is that at present times cybercrime is a flourishing industry. Soon, there will be even more recruits coming to join the dark-side forces of the cybercrime cartels. They will do it for the money!

No more free bugs you say. I say that you are leading people to become the next generation of cyber menace. Perhaps you forgot that the information security community was built on and thrived because of a simple but fundamental principle: knowledge must be free.

Sell The Bugs

Regardless how good these figures may sound to you, you need to take a step back and think really well what you are getting into. Here are a few points that you need to consider before selling exploits:

  • Cybercrime is not a joke – If you get caught selling exploits to a dodgy 3rd-party you may end up with a prison sentence longer than the sentence of a child molester. If you live in US or UK you could be charged and treated as a terrorist which will completely destroy not only your life but the life of your closes people.
  • TAX man problems – Oh Yes! Unjustifiable incomes could get you in trouble with the TAX man. The TAX man will hunt you and hurt you.
  • Broken legs and other broken parts of the body – You have no idea to whom you are selling to. Tomorrow you may wake up with broken legs and twice as poorer as the day before.
  • Even worse – People will kill for a lot less than 75K. Keep that in mind.

In my humble opinion, exploit brokerage is a risky business. There is an unquantifiable risk associated with this practice and that is only due to the high price of exploits which are sold today.

Exploit Sweatshop

Nevertheless, it is just silly to believe that no one is producing and selling exploits in a large scale. Do you remember the numerous gaming sweatshops which sprung up like wild mushrooms after the recent heavy rains in 3rd-world countries? I recall seeing a documentary on a typical day in a Chinese WoW sweatshop. I remember I saw a room full of almost naked people, numerous PCs hooked up into a gigantic DIY network spreading across the entire floor. Most of the WoW accounts were fully automated, running from virtualized platforms.

The aim was simple: a) develop many characters in a semi-automated fashion by killing small animals and other things around the WoW world and b) sell the characters plus other artifacts to western buyers for a substantial amount of money. All of this can be achieved for as little as $70 a month per person. This is a remarkable business model which works extremely well.

Similarly, all you need is a bunch of programmers from India, China, or Eastern Europe to code up fuzzers and run them against as many software products as possible. At the end of the day buffer overflow exploits a relative easy to detect. All you need is a crash caused by putting far too many 0×41 in a buffer. The crash is already an indication that something is wrong. It requires a bit of manual work to figure out whether the crash is exploitable. From personal experience, and by looking into the work of my peers, it takes approximately 10 days to develop a crash into an exploit. Most of the times, the exploitability factor of a crash is apparent and therefore no time needs to be wasted. Other times, a crash can be archived for future investigation when it could become exploitable given it meets the necessary conditions.

Perhaps you can do all that by paying someone as little as $70 a month as it is the case with WoW sweatshops. That is 3 times less than what I am paying for just hosting. Therefore, I most certainly can afford to hire 3-4 people right now and even double their salaries, but let’s do the maths:

# average exploit price: $5000
# number of people to hire: 5
# average monthly salary: $100
# job specs: write fuzzers

5 * 100 = $500 # a month expenses
5000 / 500 = 10 # months worth of work

Heck, I can even put this bill on my credit card and pay as little as $50 a month. The chances that I will sell an exploit for $5K in the next 10 months are pretty high. $5K is only if I go with a legitimate company. I can probably make 6 times more by selling it to a dodgy 3rd-party. The only thing I need to worry about is the risk.

Some Final Words

Finally, I know that a lot of people are into the security business because of all the romanticism and the myths surrounding the hacker figure. Things look different once you become the hacker and your day job and lifestyle are surrounded by hacking and breaking into systems of any sort. There is nothing romantic about it.

So, don’t get into trouble for the wrong reasons. If you are young and you need advice what to do with your career, contact us or contact any one who has been into this industry long enough to give you a good and sensible advice. Just don’t jump onto the No free bugs! bandwagon.

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recent posts from the gnucitizen cutting-edge network:

The Web Application Security Scanner in Websecurify 0.6 and 0.7
Launching Web Application Security Scans From The Command Line
Websecurify 0.6
1ST European Edition of HITB Coming Up!
Websecurify 0.6RC2 Is Available for Download

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It’s a FAIR Pandemic…

by Jack Freund on April 30, 2009

in SBN,Uncategorized

RMI welcomes Jack Freund to the RiskAnalys.is blog…

Once again the 24-hour news cycle is buffeting us with “information” about the new risk that will surely end us all. I’ve received several “breaking news” stories in my email about the pandemic in the last few days. Russia is now taking the step of banning meat from several States and nations (despite it not being transmitted by meat). Clearly, we’re being told this is a serious risk.

Several years ago in a previous life, I participated in an avian flu preparation exercise in my large, telecom manufacturing company. The goal was to determine the extent to which a large-scale pandemic would disrupt business operations, and what kind of controls could be put into place to minimize them. This primarily took the form of a questionnaire that was given to every employee. When it came my turn to fill it out and I got down to the section where I had to decide if I could do my job from home or not, I quickly choose yes. Even if I couldn’t, I thought, I’d be a fool to say so and be forced to come into the office with all those other sick people.

I am certainly unqualified to comment on whether this is or will be the next new plague. However, let’s look at this from the perspective of your own organization and how this might contribute to your risk analyses.

The swine flu will effect most organizations in one direct way, and some other, not-so-direct ways. This is mostly a business continuity risk. If you are following a business continuity management system program (such as BS 25999) you should have identified the parts of your business that are a priority (typical large revenue-generating parts of your business). Remember that in a disruption, cash flow is paramount. Creating a business process map of these parts of your business will help when framing the risk scenarios that will be analyzed by FAIR.

So, what will these risk scenarios look like?

Well, clearly any part of the business that needs people to operate it, or needs people to input something manually has the potential to cause a disruption. This is anything from manufacturing, sales, processing, etc. Any part of your business that depends on people contact (such as retail sales) will also be affected.

What the process map will also tell you is that there are several external dependencies that need to be considered. These are the not-so-direct ways I mentioned above. Namely, reliance upon other businesses (B2B) will be at the mercy of those organizations’ continuity plans (be sure to do your second party audits). Anything from service, support, shipping, and supplies will be disrupted.

The loss magnitude side of the FAIR equation will have the following trajectory. There will be heavy losses on the productivity side of the equation. Clearly, if your people can’t come to work–either because they are too sick, frightened, quarantined, under government order not to leave their homes, or deceased (let’s hope not this one), work doesn’t get done. Response costs will exist, if for no other reason than the activation of your BC plans. Replacement costs are a tricky one for me. The most obvious control would be to have an alternate work facility that isn’t geographically near your primary one. However, this flu has already hit several countries and States. I’d be interested in hearing from you in the comments what you think about this one. For some organizations the answer will be to take the hit. On the secondary loss side, there are some issues. I doubt that there will be litigation (most contracts have a force majeure clause that would be argued). If the impact of the flu is evenly dispersed, then competitive advantage and reputation become less impactful.

The biggest takeaway is that the traditional ways of dealing with this type of outage (work from home and hot/warm/cold sites) may also be effected by the same outage. It’s easy to dismiss this risk as a low frequency high loss event, but that is exactly why FAIR has the unstable risk element. It shouldn’t be written off as crazy end-times talk, but should also be taken with a  grain of salt.

There are many other interesting risk angles in this event. For instance, how the recent memory of the 1918 avian flu goaded then President Ford into calling for nationwide vaccination, how in so doing the pharmaceutical companies had to forgo work in other areas, and how the side effects of the vaccine caused Guillain-Barré syndrome in many. Some believe that the cost to human lives was greater from the vaccine than would have occurred from the flu itself.

As for me, I’ll be stocking up on paper face masks, duct tape, and Pop Tarts. I’ll read your comments from my fortified basement bunker…

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Pair of Jacks

by JonesJ on April 30, 2009

in SBN,Uncategorized

Please join me in welcoming Jack Freund as a contributor to this blog.  Jack is a certified FAIR analyst and has a boatload of experience in the information security profession.  Welcome Jack!

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Symmetric Key Cryptography (Non-Technical)

by princess of antiquity on April 30, 2009

in SBN

[a/n: I'm back for the time being. How long? We don't really know but let's make the most out of it. So, first on the agenda is the series of non-technical cryptography articles I started almost a year ago. I know this is months past due but then this and that came up then I [...]

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Sneaky Twitter Tweeting

by Allen Baranov, CISSP on April 30, 2009

in SBN

Ok, so I was bored. And then I saw the challenge -

It came, ironically enough via Twitter.

It is a Twitter client that looks like Excel. If you boss walks past then he doesn't spot you wasting time.

Nice idea but lets see if we can take it further.

Twitter inside Excel. No tricks, no fake screens. Just the real deal. Create one sheet for work and one for play.

Ok, so how?

Step 1
Open Excel

Step 2
Click "data" then "xml" then "import" and put in the following URL:

http://twitter.com/statuses/friends_timeline/[userid].rss

UserId is your userID which you can get by logging into twitter, going to twitter.com and hovering your mouse over the RSS logo on the right.

Step 3
It will ask you for your twitter username and password (unless you are logged in) and pull the information into excel. As a bonus you can right click, select XML and refresh the information.

Step 4
Different versions of Excel will work slightly differently.

Note that the information doesn't just magically appear in Excel, it is loaded via your browser (running in the background with no window) so if your employer has a proxy server (they should) with logging on (it should be) and they have suspicions about you (I hope not) they can still see your twitter browsing even if your boss can't see it by glancing over your shoulder.

Thank you Dominic for the challenge.

PS. using the Twitter API, it should be possible to post to twitter and see DMs and @ messages and your own status etc etc but I didn't feel like playing with it that much. Maybe I will. At the moment, you only get your personal stream, unsorted. In Excel.

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Do I live the first suburb in the world to be smurfed?

by Allen Baranov, CISSP on April 30, 2009

in SBN

So, strange reports started coming in to the media this week about neighbors whose gate remote controls and car remote controls had stopped working. It was across my neighborhood but not those around us. It didn't affect us thank goodness. No-one knew what was causing it.

It turns out that new special meters that have been installed are to blame. They consist of the bit that measures the electric usage and a bit that reports it back to the electricity company. They communicate with each other using the same frequency that gate and car remotes use.

Somehow they have been "over-communicating". This has led gate remotes and car remotes to stop working due to all the signal-noise. It made the press because in South Africa a non-working gate remote on a dark night can lead to some pretty ugly crime.

The electricity department denied that it was their machines until it was proven otherwise with signal measuring tools. Now they claim that it was a third party device that caused their meters to start shouting to the world at large. They have a 'patch' for the machines that can stop this issue.

Exact details are sketchy but it sounds like someone managed to launch either a smurf attack or a DoS attack on the machines which in turn made things like electric gates, garage doors and cars not work. Parts of the neighborhood were essentially shut down. So, I'm claiming to live in the first suburb to be smurfed.

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A “Monster” Spammer (NYSE:MWW)

by Richi Jennings on April 29, 2009

in SBN

Update May 1 3.30 UTC: several listwashing requests.

Dear Monster.com (NYSE:MWW),

You are spamming me. Stop it. Please.

You're sending marketing email to an address that has never given informed consent to receive it.

Not only that, but you're even breaking the spirit, if not the letter, of the U.S. CAN-SPAM Act. While your unwelcome missive does include the proscribed physical address and unsubscribe link, they are displayed in white text on a white background.

Yes, really. (I dare say they'd be more visible if my email client displayed HTML images by default, but like many clients, it doesn't.)

Naturally, it's also in violation of the law in which your UK subsidiary operates. There was no "prior consent" given, within the meaning of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003. Offenders are liable to a fine of up to £5,000 in a magistrate's court, or an unlimited fine if the trial is before a jury.

Update May 1 3.30 UTC:
I've received a couple of email messages and a Twitter DM from Monster, expressing apologies for the situation. Sadly, these expressions of regret don't extend to actually fixing the spam problem; they appear to be an attempt to listwash.

Sorry, Monster; listwashing is bad practice. My standard operating procedure is to never unsubscribe from a list that I did not subscribe to.

If Monster wishes to solve this problem, it would stop sending email to addresses of people who did not subscribe. I'm open to a public dialogue on this subject: feel free to tweet or comment here, rather than privately emailing or DM'ing.

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DISA Conference 2009 Review

by Bouch on April 29, 2009

in SBN

DISA Conference 2009 Review

I recently attended the DISA partnership conference held in Anaheim California. This year the event was a bit scaled back from previous years, but still a worthwhile attendance. My sincere thanks to LT General Carroll Pollett for hosting the conference and his great leadership of the Defense Information Systems Agency.

If you have a chance to go to next year’s event, it is well worth it. The mornings are filled with excellent high level and motivational speakers, such as the CEO of Verizon, CTO of Amazon.com, CIO of Boeing, and the CIO of Fedex. The afternoons are packed with roughly 15 – 20 tracks per hour that focus on a number of more technical aspects of information security. The evenings hold networking opportunities and leading market vendor exhibits complimented with food and drinks.

I personally took more away from the leadership and business driven presentations during the mornings. Technical skills can be taught, but great leadership and business sense needs to be absorbed from the best of us. The exhibitors were great as well. I was able to explore first hand some products that my company would be interested in and (if you have kids) take home many gizmos, gadgets, and other free giveaways.

Overall I give it a 8.5 out of 10.

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