From the monthly archives:

March 2008

NetFlow and Visibility in the Virtual Environment

by John Peterson on March 31, 2008

in SBN

With so much talk about securing communications within the virtual environment and potential hypervisor based attacks, we sometimes forget about the visibility problem within the virtual environment.

Today's blog is about just that. Visibility!

We've all probably heard the saying, its hard to secure what you can't see and that understanding your environment is the first step to security.  Well, with virtualization, understanding whats going on in your virtual environment is even a challenge.  Because virtual switches are not as feature rich as physical switches we are left unable to do many of the things we've done in the physical world that enables visibility.  One of the features that exists in physical switches that is commonly used as a security and visibility tool is Netflow.

Over the past week or so I've begun speaking with VMWare customers and Netflow enabled vendors like Mazu Networks (who has an awesome product) and they both have been struggling to figure out an elegant way of gaining visibility into the VM to VM communication within the virtual infrastructure.  You see, in the physical world people turn on Netflow on their switches so that they can do reporting and behavioral analysis but in the virtual world there is no Netflow enabled virtual switch (at least not until now - I'll get to that in a moment). 

So for companies like Mazu Networks and Lancope and for their customer base that is migrating parts of their network to virtual networks, there exists a significant challenge to the business of behavioral based analysis.  Investment in tools that use Netflow enabled switches now starts to become obsolete for parts of the network that is now virtual. 

We've heard vendors to date talk about Virtual Patch Management, Virtual Firewall, Virtual IPS but these talks leave customers confused on what they really need and doesn't necessarily solve all of the security and visibility challenges they thought they had already addressed.  Hmm.. Maybe whats needed is the ability to enable all of these things.  What about Virtual Behavioral Analysis!  Wow, another Virtual Security product that we haven't thought about!  Maybe someone could just virtualize a Behavioral Analysis product and run it inside VMWare,  put the world "Virtual" in front of the name of the technology and call it a day?  Hmmm.. Thats probably not a good idea due to the performance impacts you could encounter.  One of the biggest challenges with security is how to do all of the things we've done in the physical world in the virtual world without impacting performance.

So, back to visibility... Netflow is a technology originally invented by Cisco that sends flow records to a listening device that does some data crunching on those flow records to give you a visual picture of the data in the network.  With this data you can determine abnormalities in traffic patterns, see who the top talkers are in a network as well as home in on what network applications are running in the environment.  With this information you are now better equipped with the right level of knowledge of the environment to start putting security controls in place.  The problem is that it doesnt exist in the virtual switch provided by VMWare, Citrix, etc..

So, how can we do Netflow in the virtual environment so that we can have "Virtual Behavioral Based Analysis"?  Well after looking into this problem and talking with Netflow experts at Mazu Networks, Montego Networks has now enabled Netflow in its Virtual Security Switch. 

Heres how it works:

VM1 is sending traffic to VM2 and VM3 is sending traffic to VM9 and VM5 is sending traffic to the physical network.  Well, for the VM to VM communication, any physical Mazu or Lancope boxes will have either no visibility or have to get creative and put a solution in place thats not optimal or practical.  Vendors in this space are also probably concerned about shrinking revenue if more of the physical network starts to erode away as virtual networks take off and customers are probably concerned about investment in products that are no longer able to provide maximum value.

So as traffic enters Montego Network's Virtual Security Switch we will send a Flow record to a Mazu Networks or a like listening device on the physical network.  Since we see VM to VM communication we can extend this capability to 3rd parties by simply sending them a Netflow record for them to analyze and tada!  You have Behavioral Analysis for your virtual environment.  Notice the Netflow text on the bellow graphic.  It depicts collecting data from the virtual servers and sending a Netflow record somewhere.

Hypernet_2  

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ID Theft Incidents

by Random InfoSec Guy on March 29, 2008

in SBN


Chris Hoofnagle published a report that attempts to measure ID thefts at major financial institutions. It is no surprise that BoA is the leader of the pack here, but that is mainly due to the fact that it is also the largest institution in the list. To address that, he created another list - this time with number of incidents per billion in deposits.




Moral of the story: The highest APR on your deposit may not be the only thing to look for when shopping for a bank.

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Montego Networks spotted on radar

by John Peterson on March 28, 2008

in SBN

 

Lfa Montego Networks has been flying under radar for the past year and this week increased its elevation just enough to be seen on the virtualization industries radar detector. Montego Network’s announcement of securing virtual network communications between VM’s has everyone buzzing but what has caught most people’s attention is Montego Network’s technology that enables 3rd party security vendors to do the same thing (VM to VM). Now, I’m the CTO of Montego Networks, so my comments here are a bit biased but also first hand. So, when I tell you that it’s been a great announcement, I truelly feel it has. Everyone I have spoken with in the analyst and press community thus far has embraced the idea of security vendors working together to provide a solid solution vs. every vendor trying to be all things to everybody.

So, what does this really mean and how does it work?


Let’s say you have VM1 (Virtual Machine) and VM2 (Virtual Machine) and they need to be able to transfer data between each other but only once or twice a week. This means you can’t have them 100% isolated. Because you have a communication need between them, it probably makes sense to only open up the channels (TCP/UDP Ports) that they need to communicate on vs. opening up all channels. This helps mitigate exposure. So, let’s say you open up port 6667 and only port 6667 for them to communicate with each other. Well, this is now a bit more secure than the other option of leaving all ports open but let’s say this is a very very critical server and you want deep packet inspection done on all of its traffic. The reason you want to do this is because there is the potential that worms and BOTnet communication could occur over this port 6667 but the only way to determine that is to do deep packet inspection.  I am using port 6667 as the example because I spoke with someone that had a real live case where one of their Linux VM's got infected with this BOTnet:  http://www.energymech.net/ on port 6667

Now, I could put some sort of virtual IPS product inline and look at Physical to Virtual communication for all of the VM’s (VM1, VM2, VM3, VM4, etc.) but I don’t care to take that kind of performance hit and I also already have a physical IPS handling Physical to Virtual. What I really needs is IPS between the VM’s which I haven’t been able to find from any vendor yet and even if I did find such a solution on the market I don’t care to take the performance hit of doing IPS between ALL VM’s.

So, now that you understand the challenge, how can Montego help and what’s this HyperVSecurity thing they talked about in their press release that allows other vendors to interoperate with them. Well, with Montego’s Policy Based Switching technology you, the administrator can control what types of VM to VM traffic you would like to have inspected by a 3rd party security solution. I would simply set up a policy that says VM1 to VM2 on port 6667 will have its traffic sent to a StillSecure virtual IPS product and once a week when that traffic starts to flow it will be sent over to the IPS product for further inspection. Or if traffic starts to flow outside that once a week norm, it will still be sent for inspection. This way if some attacker tries to get in on that port he will have to make sure he can get past the IPS that now is able to VM to VM IPS.

Pretty cool huh? I think so.

 Now, back to Montego coming out of stealth mode…

You’ll start to hear and see a lot more innovation coming out of Montego Networks now that we’ve popped slightly above radar and the industry knows we are here but is scrambling trying to figure out what exactly we do, how sustainable will this new startup be and if we really have what we say we have. I’m certain competing companies will throw FUD and make all sorts of comments about what we do, how it performs, etc. etc. and all I can say is to just keep an eye on the after burners because we are starting to get lift off.

-JP

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Wake up and Smell the Coffee @ ToorCon

by John Heasman on March 27, 2008

in SBN

On April 19th I'm presenting at ToorCon in Seattle. My talk ("Wake up and smell the coffee: design flaws in the Java browser plugin") will be focused on some of the more interesting Java bugs I've found over the last few months, and how these can be exploited cross-browser, cross-platform and cross-architecture (making Java one of the scariest browser plugins there is, in my opinion). I haven't presented at ToorCon before (nor attended one for that matter) so I'm looking forward to it.


Of the talks already scheduled, several have caught my eye, including Richard Johnson's "Fast n Furious Transforms". Fourier Transforms and I were never the best of friends during my undergrad engineering degree but I always have time for cross-discipline approaches in security and Rich has given some great talks in the past (slides for which can be found here) so I will definitely be checking this one out.


I also noted that Adam Shostack is giving a talk entitled "SDL Threat Modeling: Past, Present and Future". Never was a truer word written than in the first line of his abstract: "Everyone thinks threat modeling is great, and then they encounter a formalized threat modeling process." I am looking forward to hearing his thoughts on the evolution of the SDL.


And finally, I'll get to see Nate McFeters discuss "URI Use and Abuse". Protocol handlers have provided a rich seam of vulnerabilities over the last few years and I hear Nate will be showing that things are likely to stay this way for a good while yet.


Anyway, if you're planning to go to ToorCon, drop me a line.




Cheers


John

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During the course of an average day's work, I often run across numerous IT and security products that quite frankly, belong in the garbage. When I run across these products, I often joke with my coworkers that the fix for the problem product, is to remove it and throw in the Ping River which flows right through the heart of town here. Therefore, in honor of this running joke, I have decided to start a new section on the Monkey House blog where I can draw special attention to these garbage products. I call it "Bottom of the Ping River", the only real place that these products belong. A sidebar has been added to keep a running list. Think of it as a wall of shame of sorts.

At the top of my list to toss into the river, is the Barracuda Spam "Firewall". The product in and of itself is not actually too bad. Its fairly tolerable, now ever its support team is not. Barracuda support could easily be replaced with a couple of monkeys pressing a random solution generator button. Everytime I have contacted them, it has been one random solution after another, with the most recent being instructions to rebuild the appliance! Normally I could live with a lackluster support team for a product and make every attempt to troubleshoot and resolve the issue myself. However, Barracuda does NOT allow its customers to have the root login or ssh access for the device that they paid for. Let that sink in for a second. As the author mentions in this excellent article, "I wouldn't trust everyone at Microsoft to have the only Administrator account to my Exchange server, so why would I trust Barracuda Networks to have the only root password to my SF Appliance?"

Just for kicks, I decided to open a Barracuda Support Ticket and request SSH access. Here is the response I received from the Barracuda Support Monkey:

Thank you for contacting Barracuda Networks. We can not provide you with SSH credentials. In order to have support access to any Barracuda Device you need to be a Barracuda employee or have gone through certified training to do so. The firmware and information on the Barracuda units are strictly Barracuda property. We do not allow anyone to have access unless they have gone through our Barracuda certified training and pass. If you are interested in this training and would like to know more, please contact your Barracuda Sales person.

So essentially, in order to gain access to the device we have already paid for, we must pay Barracuda FURTHER for training?? I'll pass. And for that Barracuda, you must shall now meet your ultimate demise at the Bottom of The Ping River. ....R.I.P.


***UPDATE***

Disclaimer:

This is a personal blog. The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, past or present. Additionally, this blog does not represent the thoughts, intentions, plans or strategies of my employer. It is solely my own personal opinion.

Feel free to challenge me, disagree with me, or tell me I’m completely nuts in the comments section of each blog entry, but I reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason whatsoever (abusive, profane, rude, or anonymous comments) - so keep it polite, please.

In addition, my thoughts and opinions change from time to time. I consider this a necessary consequence of having an open mind. This blog is intended to provide a semi-permanent point in time snapshot and manifestation of the various thoughts running around my brain (see banner graphic), and as such any thoughts and opinions expressed within out-of-date posts may not the same, nor even similar, to those I may hold today.

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Sawat Dee Krap! – (I Am Still Alive)

by Mestizo on March 26, 2008

in SBN

Sawat Deep Krap (Hello) from Thailand! I am alive and well here in Thailand. To the left, is a breathtaking view of my new home from the mountain top.

I have purposely taken a few months hiatus from blogging to settle into my new job and adjust to my new life 10,000 miles away. As of today, I plan to resume regular blogging activities. I've already got a few blogs written out on paper that I have been saving for some time now. :)

Over the next couple months, my blogs will start to examine some of the differences that exist between the security mindsets of the US and that of companies in south east Asia. The Monkey House blogs will also start to containing more view points from the system administrator and developer standpoints, as they relate to security. Think of this as more of a security view from "down in the trenches", which coincides with my new roles and responsibilities here with my new company. Stay tuned...

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Can I get your Username and Password ?

by Random InfoSec Guy on March 24, 2008

in SBN

A while back, I got a call from someone claiming to be from a major benefits provider and said "Hello Sir. We noticed that you have a security flag on your account. Could you please give us your username and password to reset the flag.?"

"Wow!" I almost yelled in excitement "A real live telephone scammer!" I quickly noted the possibly-fake telephone number (yeah - Nitesh alerted me about spoofcard.com a long time ago!) and attempted to get a number where I could call him back. Surprisingly - he was fine with letting me call him back at the number list on my callerID - and he told me to ask for helpdesk/customerservice/security desk something.. I forget.. I said "Sure - Let me call you right back".

I quickly looked up the benefit provider's number on the internet intending to alert them of this scam - guess what ? It was the same number. I called that number and explained that they probably have a scammer on the inside asking for userids and passwords - On explaining in detail what happened - the girl at the other end was perplexed on how I could jump to that conclusion and exclaimed that that was the only way they could clear these security flags. They login as the user and clear it out. !!!

So much for expecting a little security from a company that was managing my 401k, pension plan and other benefits!

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The Bad
One of the interesting progresses in spam tactics was the change that the ability is now not only to detect if an email is spam but trying also to understand who is the sender and what its reputation. Commtouch is analyzing billions of email per day which allows us to differentiate and track bad IPs that sends spam. When kept for a reasonable time frame, along with other data gathered from email traffic, you get a dynamic and adjusted reputation data about IPs. Usually this data is being used for “on-session-blocking”, which means that an IP with a bad reputation is being rejected on the connection level. Applying this tactic allows to dramatically decrease the bad traffic in about 85%-90% percent.

The Good
Since the spam levels are about 95% of all email traffic, it only makes sense to have a reputation service for the bad guys. But I think as our communication behaviors are changing along with the technology available, people are having a hard time coping with the “good” email, not mentioning the “boring” emails. Let say that somehow I manage to keep up with the flood of legitimate email I get every day (my secret tactic is to delete the one’s that I think are not that important, in a thought that if it’s really important , they will send it again. If that won’t work, I can always blame the sender that he was considered as spam for some reason). Going a way for a vacation is a nightmare for the inbox. When you get back the inbox is so full that I sometimes think at late hours trying to read most of them, that maybe the vacation was not worth it.
This is a global problem; it’s not just me hating to read so much mail. Michael Arrington described it perfectly in his post. That’s when I thought to my self - If we have a reputation for bad emails then we should also have for good and for boring ones.
Imagine that you are able to set your own reputation for your contacts, so for some people you will be able to get their emails to a high priority folder, and in some cases get an SMS notification about it, or rout it to a blackberry account. But this is pretty straight forward. What the reputation should do, like the bad reputation, is to manage it dynamic and change the reputation according to my actions. If someone has a good reputation but I read some of his emails and did not reply immediately, his reputation should be decreased. On the other hand, the reputation for someone who I’m starting to be more involved with should get a higher reputation.

The Annoying
As for those that just sends annoying emails, and god knows why they want to share it with me, I would prefer if the reputation will send them automatic mail telling them I joined Greenpeace, moved to Iceland and I’m never coming back.
It could work…

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Montego Networks Prediction:

Virtual Environments will be more secure than their physical counter parts by 2010.

Neil McDonald of Gartner reported in 2007 that throughout 2009, 60% of virtual environment deployments would be less secure than their physical counter parts.

Although I tend to believe Neil’s prediction I’m a bit optimistic about the markets awareness of the security concerns within virtualized environments and feel companies will start to address those concerns by 2009. I also believe that by the end of 2009 the majority of companies virtualizing will have built virtualized environments that are more secure than their physical counter parts.

Now, you may be thinking I’m either crazy or that I’m just one of these guys that just states the opposite of what someone else says!

Well, not at all. I’ve been studying the virtual security market for some time now and after talking with many companies that are deploying virtualization I’m starting to get the sense that people get it (security). It’s pretty evident that when people are made aware of what seems to be the obvious (security), that something clicks and they get it right away. In fact, many times the light bulbs start turning on and people start thinking about more creative ways to secure severs by taking advantage of virtualization which enables them to do things they’ve never been able to do before. 

So, although I agree that there has been this issue of security being once again forgotten and that 60% of virtual environments will be less secure up until 2009, I’m not so sure I’m going to underestimate the market and think that this pattern will continue much longer after that.

Take a look at the following graphic and it depicts the various layers in a network. History has proven itself time and time again that a new network layer is built first and security always comes along afterwards.

Networklayers

 

Well, one of the challenges we’ve seen with these physical networks is that it’s pretty costly, time consuming and a burden to purchase, install and administer security. Then once it’s in place and being run, you have to fork lift upgrade certain parts of your security infrastructure due to bandwidth demands and changes in application security concerns.

What virtualization brings to the table is not only cost savings for server consolidation, power consumption and datacenter space but the ability to do all of those things for parts of your security infrastructure as well.

Imagine instead of having to deploy engineers to install 20 firewalls across your datacenter, you could sit from a single workstation with a couple of guys and install 20 firewalls in hours vs. days. The reason this is possible is because now firewalls have just went virtual! You can roll them out as software images or virtual appliances without leaving the comfort of your cubical. 

Imagine being able to “virtual-lift upgrade” vs. “fork-lift upgrade” a new firewall, UTM appliance, IPS or whatever by simply powering off a Firewall Virtual Machine and powering on a new one.  Imagine being able to improve your performance by taking advantage of the multi-core processing and blade server computing trends vs. waiting for the next super fast security ASIC chip.

In the past it’s been difficult to get security as close as possible to the servers and desktops without having to deploy host based solutions. The reason for this is because we have been constrained by the physical limitations of our hardware purchases from the likes of Cisco, Extreme and Foundry. Then for vendors that have thought about putting security in a switch there has always been the price per port debate. Also, many don't want to take the risk and replace Cisco for a new startup building a new switch (ie. Force 10's Switch + IPS product).  Typically switching ports are cheap and security is more expensive and when trying to combine the two, you end up with a switch that costs a lot of money. So imagine having a 200+ port switch with a Firewall built in for $300 bucks. How could this be so? Because its virtual, and because its 100% software.

Did he just elude to a firewall for every port?  Does each Server or Desktop have firewalling between every other Server & Desktop on the same switch?  Absolutely! all because of virtualization!

Software makes it easier to bring the price per port down. When things are in software you can deploy multiple copies of them to scale your network capacity without breaking the bank. Virtualization also allows you to do things like “Freeze” and “Thaw” servers and desktops automatically when vulnerability is detected. If a denial of service is occurring against a Virtual Server you can always VMotion that server to a network with more capacity without an administrator having to lift a finger. Imagine an attack happening on a machine and instead of it being quarantined it makes a snapshot image of the infected machine and freezes it in its current bad state so you can go back and analyze how someone broke in. As you can see, there are lots of new capabilities brought to the security round table.

Virtualization will make security solutions even more powerful and increase the adoption rate of security in general due to the massive cost savings that can be appreciated through virtualization. For these reasons I see the market quickly leveraging virtualization to make Virtual Environments more Secure than their counter parts. Virtualization will enable the innovations in security that has been since UTM and Reputation based Anti-Spam.

VMWare, Virtual Iron, Citrix and others, thanks from the security industry for the innovation!

John Peterson, Montego Networks, Co-Founder & CTO

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The Captcha is Broken

by Amir on March 22, 2008

in SBN




I recently read the blog post about Google’s CAPTCHA busted in recent spammer attacks. I've searched some more and found that its not the first time that a captcha is broken, and I'm thinking it’s probably not the last time.

I guess if we'll look back enough, the captcha origin is the famous Turing Test. In 1950 Alan Turing thought of a way to test of a machine's capability to demonstrate intelligence. Well, taking into consideration the latest efforts of breaking the captcha mechanism, I think someone has really demonstrated intelligence here.

Captcha is being used to prevent from machines to do automated tasks, especially from spammers to use respected webmail vendors to spread spam. Come to think of it, captcha is used to detect who is human and who is a machine, but can it detect who is a zombie?

They Attack Captcha Now?
The most malicious activity on the Internet today originates from botnets, that is, zombies acting collectively. Zombies are serving multiple purposes such as senders of malware, phishing, and spam outbreaks, as well as participating in DDoS, data theft, click fraud and credit card fraud. Sounds scary? It is.

Captcha relies on a human ability to understand a text in a scrambled and distorted image. I have to say - sometimes they take it too far that even humans fail the test. Usually there is an algorithm that generates an image when given a random text. The recent attacks were able to bust the captcha using zombie tactics.

Zombies are getting more sophisticated and advance and are usually one or two steps ahead from most of the security solutions. Reminds me the “zombies” in the I Am Legend movie with Will Smith, where the so-called zombies watched and learned every move of their prey.

The Power of Collective Computing
If considered as a resource, zombie’s army are almost an unlimited resource available for any computing purpose. When used to break a captcha a zombie army can be used in a collective computing to do the job. The captcha is being sent into tens, hundreds, or even thousands of zombies, where each is running a lightly different algorithm or with different configuration. All results are being sent back and using a statistical prediction the text is being selected. The system can see if it was right or not, and use this information as a feedback to refine the algorithm for the next try. Of course I haven’t found any evidence for such a system. And yet, as I know who is behind these zombie programs I’m confident that if it can be done they have the capability to do it.

The Power of Collective Sexuality
I believe zombies can break a captcha up to certain level. If you increase the “human factor” then it will be almost impossible to automatically generate the captcha answer. What I mean is, that when a captcha is used to ask humans questions like a simple arithmetic equation or simple logic questions such as – “what is the opposite of cold”, ignoring the fact that these kind of captchas will be so annoying that humans will want to break the captcha and their owner, they can still be broken by zombies using humans as well.
The tactic for this kind of captcha will be a porn-network. In this tactic when a captcha is detected, the image is being transferred into a "free" porn site, where so called "innocent" users are being asked to enter the text of a captcha in order to access more hot content. This tactic is not the most effective of all, at least not at large scale, although considering the porn site popularity I guess in every giving moment there is someone out there willing to enter a few letters to get a hold of a movie with a man/woman/horse doing something that could blind you only from watching.

Captcha - What is it Good For?
I think that captcha as a defense mechanism against zombies is insufficient. Another security layer is required; otherwise we will see an increase of spam originating from respectful webmail vendors, and blocked IP ranges from these vendors will have an impact on their user’s experience.

No matter how the captcha will try to be smart, the zombies will be smarter. It’s a matter of size - they have a vast network of computing resource that they can use to any purpose they want. If breaking the captcha is worth the money for them, it will be done.

Don't get me wrong, the captcha is a good screening tool for regular web sites, but for those that have a lot to loss, zombie detection and an outbound spam protection is required to fully secure their business.

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